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The Status of the Law in Montana Where
Realty Is Gratuitously Conveyed
Upon an Oral Trust
If A gratuitously conveys land to B, who is not in confidential or
fiduciary relation with A, upon an oral agreement that B is to hold the
land in trust for A, or for C, and B, thereafter relying upon the Statute
of Frauds, repudiates the agreement in a transaction in which there is no
actual fraud, has A any remedy when the agreement is to hold the land
for him, and has A, or C, a remedy when the agreement is to hold the
land for C?
Prior to 1947, and the case of Bell-Holt-McCall Co. v. Caplce et al.
(1947) .... Mont. . . ., 175 P. (2d) 416, there was no decision in
Montana on the question of whether or not a trust by operation of law
would arise from a gratuitous conveyance upon parol trust, for either the
grantor or a third person, in the absence of breach of confidential rela-
tionship or actual fraud in the procurement of the conveyance. And the
doctrine followed in that case leaves in doubt whether the question was
actually decided. There a partner, a few hours before his death, conveyed
an interest in firm realty to a co-partner upon an oral agreement, "...
as long as it is understood that Ted takes care of Viola (the grantors
wife) and the children." After the death of the grantor the co-partner
deeded the interest to the wife, but she returned the deed and joined
with the surviving partners in a conveyance to the plaintiff. In an action
to quiet title by the plaintiff the court declared a "resulting" trust in
favor of the wife and children to the extent of the interest of the de-
ceased, stating:
"A resulting trust may arise where a conveyance is made without
consideration . . . and there is no enforceable contract or agreement
but it appears from the circumstances that the grantee was not
intended to take beneficially . . . since a resulting trust arises by
operation of law . . . oral evidence of the acts, declarations and
surrounding circumstances are admissible to show that the deed
absolute on its face was intended as a trust."
The statement that facts including a gratuitous conveyance and
breach of a confidential relationship are circumstances giving rise to a
presumption of a resulting trust is an adoption of a minority authority
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that blurs the established distinction between resulting and constructive
trusts, and failing clearly to decide, leaves in doubt the result that might
be reached in the case of a bona fide transfer upon oral trust where the
parties are not in confidential relation. For accurate consideration of the
import of this line of authority, a reference to the majority English and
American law on gratuitous conveyances is necessary.
In Montana, and other jurisdictions where the Statute of Frauds
requires trusts to be created or evidenced by a writing, the courts hold
that an oral trust in respect to land shall not be enforced as an "express"
trust.1 Admitting this requirement of the statute, it would appear, never-
theless, that the classical distinguishment between categories of trusts
should lead to both an equitable and sound result. A trust by operation
of law is provable by parol so both the resulting and constructive trusts
apparently stand available as remedy. 2 By the weight of authority in the
United States, however, where the parties do not stand in confidential
relationship and the grantee repudiates the oral agreement in a transaction
in which there is no actual fraud, there is no trust remedy for transferror
or a third person and the transferree may keep the property for himself.
3
This result, and the unnecessary hardship it creates, has its explanation in
history.
As pointed out by modem text-writers, 4 during the period prior
the Statute of Uses, the use presumed on a gratiutous conveyance was
the most common one resulting in form; the device of enfoeffing land
to another in avoidance of the burdensome incidents of feudalism was
only too well known in the law. This commonly recognized motive, then,
provided sound predicate on which to base a presumption that the grantor
intended a resulting use, rather than a gift, and under the then existing
law, the grantor, on proof of a conveyance without consideration, estab-
lHuntoon v. Lloyd (1888) 7 Mont. 365, 16 P. 573; Chowen v. Phelps
1902) 26 Mont. 524, 69 P. 54; Goodell v. Sanford (1904) 31 Mont.
163, 77 P. 522; Lynch v. Herrig (1905) 32 Mont. 267, 80 P. 240;
McLaughlin v. Corcoran (1937) 104 Mont. 590, 69 P. (2d) 597.
2R.C.M. 1935, 6784; Eisenberg v. Goldsmith (1911) 42 Mont. 563,
113 P. 1127; Wilson v. Wilson (1922) 64 Mont. 533, 210 P. 896;
Feeley v. Feeley (1924) 72 Mont. 84, 231 P. 908; First State Bank of
Philipsburg v. Mussigbrod (1928) 83 Mont. 68, 271 P. 695; Stauffacher
v. Great Falls Public Service Co. (1935) 99 Mont. 342, 43 P. (2d)
647; State ex rel. Gallatin County High School v. Brandenburg (1938)
107 Mont. 199, 82 P. (2d) 593; Bell-Holt-McCall Co. v. Coplice et al.
(1947) ........ Mont.......... 175 P. (2d) 416.
335 A.L.R. 280, (1925); Mont. & P. Dig. 96.
41 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1st ed. 1939) 64, p. 246; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1st ed. 1935) &453, p. 1351.
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lished a prima facie resulting use in his favor. The Statute of Uses, in
1535, by executing the use and transforming it into a vested legal estate
in the feoffor, rendered nugatory such enfoeffment and eliminated the
factual basis for the presumption. Nevertheless, the presumption persisted
in the English law. Even after the enactment of the Statute of Frauds
in 1676, since uses arising by the implication or construction of law were
expressly excepted from the required writing, parol evidence was admis-
sible to show that the conveyance was gratuitous and a resulting use pre-
sumptively arose. The rule was not, however, carried over into the Amer-
ican law. Though the English law of equity found its way here during
colonial times, the American courts, recognizing -that the reason upon
which the presumption was based had ceased to exist, never applied the
doctrine. Conversely, the modern American rule is that a gratuitous
conveyance gives 'rise to a presumption of gift, in that a recital of con-
sideration in the deed is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a resulting
trust.5 If the conveyance is accompanied by an oral agreement to hold
the property in trust, the Statute of Frauds prevents enforcement of the
agreement as an express trust.
So, too, by the weight of authority, when the grantee who repudi-
ates the agreement does not stand in confidential relation to the grantor,
there is no remedy by way of a constructive trust.6 A constructive trust
will arise where property is acquired through fraud, duress, undue in-
fluence or mistake, wrongful disposition of another's property, and viola-
tion of a confidential relationship or fiduciary duty.7 But the American
majority limits the grounds for a constructive trust to these established
situations. So, if in any of these circumstances an interest in land is
involved, evidence of parol agreements is admissible, notwithstanding the
Statute of Frauds, to show that the land was so acquired; the law, thereon,
basing a constructive trust. But in the absence of any of the above enumer-
ated circumstances, no basis for a constructive trust is deemed to exist,
and the Statute of Frauds prevents enforcement of the oral agreement as
an express trust.
By the English majority view the constructive trust arising on breach
of the oral agreement gives the grantor a right to restitution, and the
535 A.L.R. 280, (1925); Mont. & P. Dig. U63, 88.
6Eisenberg v. Goldsmith (1911) 42 Mont. 563, 113 P. 1127; Roecher v.
Story (19311 91 Mont. 28, 5 P. (2d) 205.
7 Huffine v. Lincoln (1916) 52 Mont. 585, 160 .P. 820; Lewis v. Lindley
(1897) 19 Mont. 422, 48 P. 765; Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvich
(1939) 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. (2d) 316.
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principle of restitution is applied where the agreement is to hold the land
for a third party as well as for the grantor. The fundamental basis for
raising a constructive trust is prevention of unjust enrichment to the
grantee, and parol evidence is admitted to show unjust enrichment inde-
pendent of circumstances respecting the procurement of the conveyance
or the relationship of the parties. If, therefore, a grantee, relying upon
the Statute of Frauds repudiates a promise to hold the land for either the
grantor or a third party, though the statute prevents carrying out the
intention of the parties as such, the grantee may be compelled to restore
the property to the grantor, parol proof of unjust enrichment- being ad-
missible even if the parties to the conveyance do not stand in confidential
relation. 8
Proceeding without inquiry into the merits of the foregoing authori-
ties, what is the position of Bell.Holt.McCall Co." '. Caplice, et d. and
the cases it cites?9 The doctrine, briefly stated, is that a gratuitous con-
veyance upon an oral trust are facts and circumstances giving rise to a
presumption of a resulting trust, and it comprises the bulk of authority
normally considered as American minority in accord with the English
rule.10 But is this the position in fact? An examination of the decisions
leads rather to a theoretical dilemma. To begin with, although the cases
place no particular reliance upon the fact, a confidential relationship is
found in all of them. The decisions do not, therefore, extend the remedy
of a constructive trust to a situation in the absence of a confidential re-
lationship, which, from the standpoint of constructive trusts at least, is
significant of the English view. On the other hand, in addition to state-
ments in terms of the resulting trust doctrine, there is other language in
the cases indicating that the courts intended a resulting trust. 11 So, in
reliance on the language generally, argument could be made that the cases
raise a resulting trust. But, as against this argument, immediate contention
must be made that the courts could not have meant that a presumption
of resulting trust might in some way arise from a gratuitous conveyance-
a doctrine non-existant since the Statute of Uses. A more accurate state-
8 Dovies v. Otty (1865) 35 Beov. 208; In re Duke of Marlborough (1894)
2 Ch. 133; Clark v. Eby (1867) Grant Ch. 371.
9 Gray et al. v. Beard (19413) 66 Or. 59, 133 P. 791; Tolon v. Johnson
(1924) 104 Okla. 201, 230 P. 865.
101 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1st ed. 1939) .44, p. 248. "... a number of
American cases which seem to follow the English view."
11Tolon v. Johnson (1924) 104 Okla. 201, 230 P. 865. "... But we
cannot agree with counsel that because plaintiffs pleaded the confidential
relations of the parties and an oral agreement . . . would prevent the
creation of a resulting trust."
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ment would therefore seem to be that the decisions stated the resulting
trust doctrine, but only in respect to facts that should have given rise
to a constructive trust, and granted relief only where the majority would
by way of a constructive trust, and intended nothing more than a trust
by operation of law.
Particularly in regard to the Caplice case would this appear to be
true. The court in declaring a trust for the wife and children extended
the remedy to third persons, a holding in juxtaposition with the English
cases where the property is restored to the grantor. It was the dissenting
opinion, rather, in contending the partnership interest should be restored
to the deceased estate and distributed under the Montana statute on
intestate succession, that was in accord with the English view. Further-
more, the court in no way purported that a new question was there pre-
sented for decision, because the fiduciary duty of partners has been rec-
ognized in Montana 12 and in earlier Montana cases involving the breach
of a confidential relationship the majority constructive trust theory was
applied.
13
It is therefore submitted that whether or not a breach of the oral
agreement will raise a constructive trust, in absence of a confidential
relationship, remains an undecided question in Montana. But the doctrine
of the Caplice case, for the reason that it places no emphasis upon the
presence of such a relationship, provides indication that the court will,
on being presented the question, raise a constructive trust for the grantor,
or for a third person, dependent upon the intention expressed in the
agreement.
In raising a trust for a third person, where that is the agreement,
the majority opinion in the Caplice case seems unsound. And so far as
the case may indicate that the Montana court will hold similarly in a
case without a 'confidential relationship the same can be said. Although
there is case authority and text opinion supporting both the English doc-
trine of restoration, 14 and the result in the Caplice case, 15 to raise a trust
by operation of law for a third party seems a clear violation of the Statute
of Frauds. The third person, due to the statute, could not enforce the
agreement at the time it was made. And having given nothing there would
12 Wilson v. Wilson (1922) 64 Mont. 533, 210 P. 896.
13Hufine v. Lincoln (1916) 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820.
14AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) p. 429; Peacock v.
Nelson (1872) 50 Mo. 256 ......... P ..........
15Costigon, Trusts Based on Oral Promises to Hold in Trust, to Convey, or
to Devise, Made by Voluntary Grantee, 12 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1914);
Stiefvater v. Stiefvater (1932) 246 Ky. 646, 53 S.W. (2d) 926.
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be no enrichment at his expense if the grantee were allowed to keep the
property. So, after a default by the grantee, to raise a trust for a third
person seems but enforcing the oral agreement. The situation is different
where the agreement is to hold for the grantor. The unjust enrichment,
if the grantee were permitted to retain the property, is at the expense of
th grantor, and a constructive trust can be raised on that basis, a ground
separate and distinct from mere enforcement of the agreement.16
But to the extent that the doctrine of the Caplice case may provide
argument for a constructive trust based on the English view, it represents
a desirable development in the Montana law. Where the parties to the
conveyance do not stand in confidential relation, the hardship created by
the American majority rule is obvious. The basis of the constructive trust
is unjust enrichment. It is not imposed because of the intention of the
parties, 17 but for the purpose of preventing the unjust enrichment ac-
cruing to the grantee if he were permitted to retain the property.18 And
unjust enrichment is a constant factor, be it the reward of a rule of law
or the fruit of confidence. The benefit, title to the grantor's land, is the
same in both cases. Yet the weight of authority insists otherwise and the
rule recognizes the unjust enrichment arising on disloyalty of an agent
but ignores it on the breach of a promise by a friend or neighbor.
The root of the majority theory, of course, is the Statute of Frauds.
It is considered that to accept proof of the parol trust in absence of any
of the established grounds for a constructive trust would in effect be
enforcing the agreement in violation of the statute. But when it is
remembered that unjust enrichment is not dependent for its existence upon
the relationship of the parties, the theory becomes mere verbal distinction.
The leading text writers agree that unjust enrichment alone should be
sufficient ground for a constructive trust.19 And in substantiation of this
proposition it can be illustrated that the cases under the American ma-
jority are inconsistent with the law in other analogous situations. Where
a conveyance of land is made upon an oral agreement that the deed is to
operate as security for a loan and the grantee is to reconvey on payment
of the debt, parol evidence is admissible to show that the deed absolute
on its face is in fact a mortgage, and upon a refusal to reconvey, equity
161 SCOTTS, TRUSTS (1st ed. 1939) 445, p. 265.
17 Meogher v. Horrington (1927) 78 Mont. 457, 254 P, 432.
18 The American Low Institute in recognition of this proposition includes
the constructive trust in the RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION.
191 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1st ed. 1939) 444, p. 251; 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS
(Ist ed. 1935) 4497, p. 219.
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will raise a constructive trust for the benefit of the grantor.20 Also if
B orally promises to protect A's property by buying it in at a foreclosure
sale and to hold the property for A, and subsequent to judicial sale B
refuses to perform, parol proof of the agreement is admissible for the
purpose of raising a constructive trust. 21 Furthermore, from the standpoint
of the Statute of Frauds, there should be greater objection to the proof
of an oral mortgage or agreement in conjunction with a judicial sale
than to proof of parol trust upon a gratuitous conveyance, for the unjust
enrichment is greater in the case of a gratuitous conveyance than in either
the oral mortgage or judicial sale. In the former, the grantee gives nothing
in exchange for the land but a promise, but in the latter he pays out of
pocket by way of loan or the sale price.
It would seem therefore that the English view is the correct one.
And it is for this reason that the implication involved in Bell.Holt-McCall
Co. V. Caplice et al. is here mentioned as a commendable one. To compel
a grantee, who has given nothing but a promise of trusteeship, to restore
the property to. the rightful owner is in every sense justified. And if that
step be taken, in Montana at least, the layman ignorant of the law but
unsuspecting of his neighbor will be provided equitable rescue from the
web of the Statute of Frauds.
Orville Robbins.
2OGibson v. Morris State Bonk (1914) 49 Mont. 60, 140 P. 76; Horring-
ton v. Butte & Superior Copper Co. (1916) 82 Mont. 263, 157 P. 181;
Nolan v. Benninghoff (1922) 64 Mont. 68, 208 P. 905; Johnson v.
Opheim (1923) 67 Mvont. 126, 214 P. 951; Welch v. Thomas (1936)
102 Mont. 591, 61 P. (2d) 404; Lewis v. Bowman (1942) 113 Mont.
68, 121 P. (2d) 162; In re Days Estate (1917) ........ Mont .......... 177
P. (2d) 862.
2 1Largey v. Leggatt (1904) 30 Mont. 148, 75 P.' 950; Marcellus v. Wright
(1916) 51 Mont. 559, 154 P. 714; McKenzie v. Evans (1934) 96
Mont. 1, 29 P. (2d) 657.
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